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BANK PRIVATIZATION IN VIETNAM: EXAMINING 
CHANGES TO MANAGEMENT IN VIETNAM’S NEW 
BANKING LAW, DECREE NO. 59/2009/ND-CP 
George B. Radics † 
Abstract: Due to its WTO obligations, by 2010 Vietnam must open its banking 
system to the world.  As a result, the nation attempted to drastically modernize its state 
owned banks through partial privatization.  This partial privatization, locally translated as 
equitization, proposed serious challenges to the existing legal infrastructure facilitating 
banks.  To cope with these new challenges, in September 2009, Vietnam’s new banking 
law, Decree 59/2009/ND-CP, was passed.  An important change in the new banking law 
is its stricter regulation on the qualifications of managers.  It is suspected that such 
regulation signals the nation’s resistance to surrender control over its banks and commit 
to reforms.  The new banking law also further relies on the problematic Penal Code and 
the Criminal Procedure Code.  Faulty Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes can lead to 
fraudulent lawsuits and managers losing their positions.  In spite of its problems, the new 
banking law is workable and a step in the right direction.  By relying on existing 
management laws, as opposed to those introduced by the new banking law, and 
upgrading the Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes, many of the potential problems 
created by the new banking law can be resolved. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In May of 2002, Kim Brix Andersen, a Danish national, left his job as 
a vice-president at the largest bank in Singapore to help manage the foreign 
funds of a quarry project in Vietnam.1  The quarry project was established by 
two British nationals, Peter Laking and Sean McCormack.2  In mid-2002, 
two Irish investors suspected Laking and McCormack of selling their shares 
in the project without their knowledge.  The two Irishmen lodged a civil 
claim against Laking and McCormack in the High Court of London and a 
complaint against them with the Vietnamese public security ministry in 
Vietnam.3  Although the case was dropped in the British High Courts for 
lack of evidence, the Vietnamese government continued to investigate the 
                                           
†
 Juris Doctor expected in 2010, University of Washington School of Law.  B.A., University of 
California, Los Angeles; Ph.D., National University of Singapore.  The author would like to thank 
Professor Jane Winn at the University of Washington School of Law and the editorial staff of the Pacific 
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1
  Denmark Summons Vietnamese Ambassador Over Banker’s Case, BBC MONITORING EUROPE, 
Jan. 24, 2005, available at LEXIS, The BBC Monitoring Europe File [hereinafter Denmark Summons 
Vietnamese Ambassador]. 
2
  Fair Trials International, Peter Laking-Vietnam: Update as of June 2007, 
http://www.fairtrials.net/index.php/cases/spotlight/peter_laking/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2009) [hereinafter 
Fair Trials International]. 
3
 Id.  
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case for three months.4  Laking and McCormack fled Vietnam in May 2003 
after supposedly experiencing harassment from employees of the Irish 
investors and the Vietnamese government.5  When Laking returned in May 
2004, he was arrested in Ho Chi Minh City.6  He joined Andersen and Tom 
Hong, an American investor associated with the company, in prison.  
Andersen was alleged to have helped the two embezzle $6.5 million USD 
since the time he was put in charge of foreign funds. 7   Vietnamese 
newspapers alleged that the project for which they worked was a multi-
million dollar scam, set up as a false company used to swindle money from 
foreign investors.8  Andersen, after intervention by the Danish ambassador, 
was released in January 2005 due to lack of evidence against him, after 15 
months of being incarcerated.9  Laking has been out on bail since July 31, 
2007.10  According to Fair Trials International, Laking is still awaiting trial 
while prosecutors attempt to build a case.11 
As Vietnam attempts to enter the world market, it must strike a 
balance between welcoming foreign investment and management, while still 
maintaining control over the internal workings of the banks.12  As seen in the 
Andersen case,13 investment opportunities are luring high-ranking managers 
to the country.  The case also shows that in attempts to control these 
managers, the Vietnamese government is willing to go to extreme lengths to 
investigate a case against them, even if this means depriving an individual of 
his or her position in a company and/or procedural rights.  This situation 
becomes more complicated as more industries begin to welcome foreign 
investment.  Due to obligations under the World Trade Organization, 
                                           
4
 Id. 
5
  Id. 
6
  Rosemary Hannan, Haughey’s Lawyer ‘Was the Victim of Vietnam Scam,’ SUNDAY TIMES 
(London), July 16, 2005, available at LEXIS, Sunday Times (London) File. 
7
  UK, US Citizens to Stand Trial for Decades-Long Mining Scams, THAN NIEN NEWS, Mar. 21, 
2006, http://www.thanhniennews.com/overseas/?catid=12&newsid=13708 (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).   
8
  Prosecution Proposed for Three Foreigners, THE SAIGON TIMES DAILY, July 2, 2004, available at 
2004 WLNR 11975828.  
9
  Denmark Summons Vietnamese Ambassador, supra note 1. 
10
  Ben Bland, Briton in Kafka-esque Ordeal, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Britain), Feb. 13, 2009, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/2813138/Briton-in-Kafka-esque-Vietnam-ordeal.html (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2010).    
11
  Fair Trials International, supra note 2.  
12
  See Andrew Lam, New Year, Old Unresolved Passion: Vietnam and its Diaspora, NEW AMERICA 
MEDIA, Feb. 7, 2008, http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).  
In the article, the author uses the term “double-edged sword” to refer to the influx of investment and ideas 
from Vietnamese Overseas, or “Viet Kieu.”  The term also applies well to all Vietnamese sectors 
experiencing an influx of foreign ideas.  
13
  Throughout this comment, this situation will be referred to as a “case,” even though the lawsuit 
was dismissed at the trial court level in the UK and, because the lack of evidence, the case is still being 
prepared for trial in Vietnam. 
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Vietnam must “equitize” its banks in order to prepare the nation for the 
influx of foreign capital.14  Equitization, or the process of selling off shares 
in state-owned enterprises, proposes to modernize Vietnamese state-owned 
banks.15  Equitization also proposes the introduction of a cadre of forward 
thinking and entrepreneurial managers.16  In addressing this issue, and the 
general inadequacy of the old banking law to deal with the newly equitized 
banks, in September 2009, the State Bank of Vietnam released Decree 
59/2009/ND-CP, (“New Banking Law”).17  This comment argues that the 
New Banking Law takes a heavy-handed approach in controlling the influx 
of new managers by creating stricter regulations for management and more 
opportunity for the government to remove managers arbitrarily. 
Vietnam’s New Banking Law increases the government’s authority to 
intervene and remove managers from their positions because it heightens 
qualification requirements for managers, creates more situations in which 
managers can be removed on the basis of past activities, and enhances 
reliance on the problematic Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code.  This 
comment will demonstrate how the New Banking Law contains stricter 
regulation on the qualifications of managers compared to the other two laws 
regulating Vietnamese banks: Law No. 60/2005/QH11 (“Enterprise Law”)18 
and Law No. 02/1997/QH10 (“Law on Credit Institutions”).19  Moreover, as 
can be seen in the Andersen case, even if the stricter qualifications and 
extended prohibitions against managers are remedied, problems with the 
Penal Code and Criminal Procedure create significant problems with due 
process, making it easy for the state to remove managers from their position.  
This comment argues, therefore, that instead of relying on management 
regulations introduced by the New Banking Law, management regulations 
already found in existing banking regulations, such as those in the Enterprise 
Law, should be used, while loopholes in the Penal and Criminal Procedure 
Codes should be critically examined.  
                                           
14
 Working Party on the Accession of Viet Nam, Schedule CLX- Vietnam: Part II – Schedule of 
Specific Commitments in Services, 40, WT/ACC/VCM/48/Add.2 (Oct. 27, 2006), available at 
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp?DDFDocuments/t/wt/acc/vnm48a2.doc.   
15
  See TUYET TREES, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, VIETNAM:  BANKING AND FINANCIAL SECTOR 1 
(2008), http://www.buyusa.gov/arkansas/vietbank09.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2010). 
16
  Such a move is not unprecedented.  China introduced new and foreign managers into its state 
owned enterprises in order to modernize them.  See Andrew Sargeant & Stephen Frankel, Managing People 
in China:  Perceptions of Expatriate Managers, 33 J.WORLD BUS. 17, 19 (1998). 
17
  New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP 
(Viet.).  
18
 Law on Enterprises, 2005, No. 60/2005/QH11 (Viet.). 
19
 Law on Credit Institutions, 1997, No. 02/1997/QH10 (Viet.) (amended 2004). 
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Section II of this comment provides a background to the proposed 
changes and will introduce the New Banking Law, the Enterprise Law, and 
the Law on Credit Institutions.  Section III analyzes potential problems 
inherent in the New Banking Law including conflicts with existing laws and 
its reliance on a problematic Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code.  
Finally, section IV provides potential solutions to the problems found in the 
New Banking Law.   
II. PROFESSIONALIZING MANAGEMENT THROUGH EQUITIZATION IS 
NECESSARY BUT MUST NOT CONFLICT WITH THE VIETNAMESE 
BANKING LAW INFRASTRUCTURE 
This section provides a background to the proposed changes, and will 
introduce the New Banking Law, the Enterprise Law and the Law on Credit 
Institutions.  It will start off with a discussion on the significance of 
management to professionalizing Vietnamese banks and then will discuss the 
New Banking Law and how it conflicts with the Enterprise Law and the Law 
on Credit Institutions, the two laws that help provide the legal infrastructure 
to banking in Vietnam.  
A. Addressing Management Issues Through Equitization Will 
Professionalize Vietnamese Banks 
In a regulated economy dominated by state owned enterprises, such as 
Vietnam, managers typically have weaker incentives to maximize efficiency 
and profits.20  This is because “incentives for efficient management are weak 
if managers are appointed on the basis of political decisions rather than 
professional capacity, and if salaries and job security are not related to 
economic performance.”21  On the other hand, due to preferential treatment 
from the state with regards to land, export quotas, and tax treatment, 
privileges of this kind have created substantial rents for the State Owned 
Enterprises (“SOE”), leading to an entrenched cadre of managers and 
employees. 22   These managers and employees have in certain cases 
complicated governmental attempts to evaluate the performance and assets 
of companies.23  In addition, global market forces, the U.S. Government, and 
                                           
20
   Frederik Sjöholm, State Owned Enterprises and Equitization in Vietnam 6, (Stockholm School of 
Economics, Working Paper No. 228, 2006), http://swopec.hhs.se/eijswp/papers/eijswp0228.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2010). 
21
   Id.  
22
   Vu Quoc Ngu, SOE Equitization in Vietnam: Experiences, Achievements, and Challenges, in S.E. 
ASIAN AFFAIRS,  327, 330 (2003). 
23
  Id. at 330-32. 
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international agencies are placing pressure on individual firms and the 
Vietnamese Government to increase transparency and to open up many 
protected industries and enterprises.24     
With these factors in mind, the Vietnamese government continues on 
its campaign to privatize its SOEs to modernize and professionalize their 
business practices.25  Approaching the process cautiously, some authors have 
argued that Vietnam adopted a gradualist approach to privatizing, or 
“equitizing” its SOEs.26  Equitization is the dissolution, restructuring, and 
privatization process of many formerly state-owned monopolies. 27  It 
liberalizes both internal and external trade regimes, and encourages private 
(both domestic and foreign) investment in the economy.28  
Equitization in Vietnam was first initiated in 1992. 29   Small and 
medium enterprises were part of the first wave of equitized firms.30  From 
1992 to 1998, just seventeen SOEs completed equitization formalities. 31  
“Equitization picked up momentum in 1999 and 2000 so that by September 
2001 some 700 state enterprises had reportedly completed equitization 
proceedings.”32  It is reported that from 2003 to 2004, this number had risen 
to 1,292.33  Furthermore, while initially small and medium sized enterprises 
were equitized, now larger SOEs, such as Vietnam’s state-owned banks, are 
also making the change.  
Today, external obligations are forcing Vietnam to open up its banking 
system to the world.  In 2001, the country signed a Bilateral Free Trade 
Agreement with the United States requiring that by 2010, U.S. banks be 
allowed to enter the country on equal footing with local banks.34  In 1995, 
Vietnam promised to join the ASEAN Free Trade Area and reform its local 
                                           
24
  See Martin Painter, The Politics of Economic Restructuring in Vietnam:  The Case of State-owned 
Enterprise ‘Reform.’ 25 CONTEMP. S.E. ASIA 1, 32-33 (2003). 
25
  See Sjöholm, supra note 20, at 15. 
26
  See Painter, supra note 24, at 24; Sjöholm, supra note 20, at 2. 
27
  Vu Thanh Tu Anh, Policy Brief No. 33: Vietnam – The Long Road to Equitization, 3-4 (The 
William Davidson Institute: Univ. of Michigan, 2005). 
28
  Id. 
29
  Martin Gainsborough, Slow, Quick, Quick: Assessing Equitization and Enterprise Performance 
Prospects in Vietnam, 19 J.  COMMUNIST STUD. & TRANS. POL. 49, 50 (2003). 
30
  Id. 
31
  Id.  
32
  Id. 
33
  Truong Dong Loc, Nguyen Huu Dang & Nguyen Van Ngan, Equitization and Firm Performance: 
The Case of Vietnam 18 (E. ASIAN DEV. NETWORK, Working Paper No. 32, 2007), 
http://www.eadn.org/truongdongloc.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2010). 
34
  Agreement Between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Trade 
Relations, U.S.-Vietnam, Jul. 13, 2000, Hein’s No. KAV 5968, available at 
http://www.usvtc.org/trade/bta/US-VN-BTA.pdf. 
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banking sector to correspond to international standards by 2012.35  As part of 
the entrance requirements into the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), 
Vietnam shored up its reforms in the banking sector to prepare its industries 
for entry into a globally competitive market.36  Therefore, in addition to the 
need to modernize its banks for national development, these global 
obligations imposed by the WTO place further pressure on the Vietnamese 
government to modernize and retrofit its banks. 
In September 2009, the New Banking Law took effect.37  The New 
Banking Law plays a very important role in upgrading and professionalizing 
the banking sector in Vietnam.  According to the State Bank of Vietnam, the 
New Banking Law is meant to govern the organization, administration, 
management, and operation of banks.38  It will also help the Vietnamese 
commercial banking sector improve its organizational structure and 
operations to meet the needs for development and international integration.39 
B. The New Banking Law Must Not Conflict with the Enterprises Law 
and the Law on Credit Institutions  
Apart from the New Banking Law, Vietnamese banks operate in 
conjunction with two other important laws.  These laws are the Enterprise 
Law40 and the Law on Credit Institutions.41  The New Banking Law must 
therefore achieve its valuable task of preparing the nation for global 
competitiveness while not interfering with these important existing laws. 
                                           
35
  ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) is a trade bloc agreement by the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations supporting local manufacturing in all ASEAN countries.  Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 
Protocol for the Accession of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to the Agreement on the Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area, Dec. 15, 1995, available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/12372.htm.   
36
  See TREES, supra note 15. 
37
  See Newsletter No. 03, VCFO, (VIETNAM CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICERS CLUB, HANOI, VIET.), Aug. 
5, 2009, http://www.cfo.vn/cfolib/uploads/VCFO%20News/VCFO_Newsletter_August09.pdf (last visited 
Jan.28, 2010). 
38
  State Bank of Vietnam, Tin Tuc Su Kien: Toa Dam lay y kien Du thao Nghi dinh to chuc, quan tri 
va hoat done cua NHTM. [Discussion Opinions: Draft Decree Organization, Management, and Operation 
of Commercial Banks] (Feb. 10, 2007), http://www.sbv.gov.vn/vn/home/tinHDNH.jsp?tin=2409 (last 
visited Jan. 19, 2009).   
39
  Viet Stock Financial Information, Monthly Information on Banking Activities: July (Aug. 13, 
2009), http://vietstock.com.vn/Tianyonen/Index.aspx?ArticleID=76179&ChannelID=37 (last visited Aug. 
12, 2009). 
40
 Law on Enterprises, 2005, No. 60/2005/QH11 (Viet.). 
41
   Law on Credit Institutions, 1997, No. 02/1997/QH10 (Viet.) (amended 2004).  
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1. The Enterprise Law Protects Businesses from Governmental 
Intervention  
The Enterprise Law of 2005 sets forth provisions on the 
establishment, organizational management, and operation of limited liability 
companies, share-holding companies, partnerships, and sole-proprietorships 
belonging to all economic components.42  Passed in 2005, and effective as of 
July 1, 2006, the law “is intended to apply equally to domestic and foreign 
invested enterprises.”43  
The Enterprise Law applies to Vietnamese banks since according to 
the law, an enterprise is an “economic organization that has its own name, 
assets, stable office and is duly constituted for the purpose of conducting 
business.”44  The Enterprise Law also enables the state to supervise, inspect, 
and handle violations of national law by enterprises.45  Although the New 
Banking Law creates additional requirements to which banks must abide, 
these requirements must not conflict with the Enterprise Law, which protects 
enterprises from governmental intervention.46 
2. The Law on Credit Institutions Creates a Level Playing Field and 
Prevents Preferential Treatment  
The Law on Credit Institutions governs “the organization and 
operation of credit institutions and banking activities conducted by other 
organizations.”47  The law, which was passed by the National Assembly on 
June 15, 2004, aims to make capital markets run effectively, satisfy the 
demand for capital from businesses, and keep up with economic changes in 
the global economy.48  When it was drafted, the Law on Credit Institutions 
was meant to “create a level playing field for all credit institutions and 
prevent preferential treatment.”49 
Currently, it is rumored that the state bank is drafting new legislation 
to replace the Law on Credit Institutions and create a more efficient 
                                           
42
   Law on Enterprises, 2005, No. 60/2005/QH11, art. 1 (Viet.). 
43
 Memorandum from Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, LLP on Vietnam’s New Investment Law 
(Mar. 2006), http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2006/14675.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2010). 
44
  Law on Enterprises, 2005, No. 60/2005/QH11, art. 4(1) (Viet.). 
45
  Id. art. 161(1-5). 
46
  Id. 
47
  Law on Credit Institutions, 1997, No. 02/1997/QH10 (Viet.) (amended 2004).  “Other institutions” 
refers to non-state actors. 
48
  Vietnamese Law Consultants, Amendments to Law on Credit Institutions (Oct. 2005), 
http://vietnamese-law-consultancy.com/english/content/browse.php (last visited Jan. 25, 2010). 
49
  Mergers of Viet Nam's Credit Institutions Regulated, ASIA NEWS NETWORK, May 26, 2009, 
http://www.asianewsnet.net/news.php?id=5922&sec=2 (last visited Jan. 25, 2010). 
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regulatory framework.50  Yet talks of this new Law on Credit Institutions 
have not led to specific dates as to when the law will emerge. This poses a 
problem since the existing Law on Credit Institutions contains clauses that 
conflict with the New Banking Law.  
 
3. The New Banking Law Facilitates Vietnam’s Development Needs by 
Professionalizing the Nation’s Banks 
Drafted by the State Bank of Vietnam, the New Banking Law is 
designed to supersede Decree No. 49/2000/ND-CP,51 the former banking 
law.52  The New Banking Law is intended to apply to all commercial banks, 
including SOEs, joint stock banks, joint venture banks, and banks with one 
hundred percent foreign capital.53  It also, for the first time ever, provides for 
the use of the term “bank,” stating that only organizations granted licenses 
under the Law on Credit Institutions or permitted by the State Bank of 
Vietnam, can be referred to as banks.54  Defining the term “bank” is the first 
critical step in streamlining control over the banking sector by the New 
Banking Law, the Law on Credit Institutions, and the Enterprise Law. 
The New Banking Law must also serve several, very important 
functions.  First, it should enable all Vietnamese state-owned banks to 
equitize by 2010, the deadline by which Vietnam must equitize due to its 
agreement with the WTO.55  Second, it must provide the guidelines private 
investors must abide by when buying into state-owned banks.  Last, these 
changes should bring the industry up to international standards.  All three of 
these changes are necessary to support Vietnam’s development in the years 
                                           
50
  Spreading Out the Credit, VFR (Vietnam Financial Review, Hanoi, Viet.), May 23, 2008), at 1, 
http://www.nri.co.jp/english/opinion/vfr/06SpreadingOut.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2010). 
51
 Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2000, 49/2000/ND-CP (Viet.), amended by 
New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP (Viet.). 
52
 ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION (APEC), ELECTRONIC INDIVIDUAL ACTION PLAN, UPDATE FOR 
VIET NAM FOR 2009 (2009), http://www.apec-iap.org/document/VN_2009_IAP.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 
2010).   
53
  New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP, art. 1 
(Viet.). 
54
  State Bank to Detail Rules on Commercial Banks, 13 VIET. L. AND LEGAL FORUM 156, 24 (2007). 
55
  Xinhua, Vietnam to Finish Bank Equitization by 2010, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Dec. 5, 2005, 
http://english.people.com.cn/200512/05/eng20051205_225706.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).  By 2010, 
Vietnam is required to receive foreign banks on equal footing with local banks.  This places pressure on the 
nation to equitize its state-owned banks.  Therefore, although Vietnam is not obligated to equitize all its 
state-owned banks by 2010, there is strong pressure to do so by then.  See Working Party on the Accession 
of Viet Nam, Schedule CLX- Vietnam: Part II – Schedule of Specific Commitments in Services, 40, 
WT/ACC/VCM/48/Add.2 (Oct. 27, 2006), http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/directdoc.asp? 
DDFDocuments/t/wt/acc/vnm48a2.doc (last visited Jan. 28, 2010).   
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to come.  It is speculated that in the next 10 years, Vietnam is going to need 
$140 billion USD to retrofit its crumbling infrastructure in order to keep up 
with its growth.56  Vietnamese banks must play a central role in raising and 
disseminating these funds.  In order to do this, the New Banking Law must 
effectively modernize Vietnamese banks to efficiently and effectively serve 
this function while further enticing foreign investment.   
An important element to modernizing Vietnam’s banks is providing 
bank managers with the opportunity to adapt to the dynamic conditions of 
the market.  Chapter III of the New Banking Law entitled “General 
Management Principles” lays the guidelines for who can serve in a 
Vietnamese bank.57  Although the responsibilities of the different managerial 
positions remain the same, the requirements of who can serve in such 
positions have changed.58 According to the State Bank, the previous banking 
law “has demonstrated a number of weaknesses during its time, not least of 
which is the lack of detail regarding the qualifications, duties and 
responsibilities of general directors or members of bank boards and audit 
committees.”59  The New Banking Law therefore attempts to address these 
issues.  In the process, however, several new problems emerge.  
III. THE NEW BANKING LAW ALLOWS THE GOVERNMENT MORE CONTROL 
IN REMOVING MANAGERS FROM OFFICE BY INTRODUCING STRICTER 
MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS AND BY ENHANCING RELIANCE ON THE 
PROBLEMATIC CRIMINAL LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
First, the New Banking Law provides the government more control in 
removing managers from their positions by introducing stricter regulations 
on the qualifications of managers and more prohibitions against managers 
than the Law on Credit Institutions and the Enterprise Law.  Second, the 
New Law’s enhanced reliance on loopholes within the Penal Code and 
Criminal Procedure Code makes it easy for the government to arbitrarily 
remove managers from office.  This section explores these two problems 
with the New Banking Law. 
                                           
56
 Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam Infrastructure Funds Debuts, 
http://www.mofa.gov.vn/mofa/en/nr040807104143/nr040807105039/ns070815101124 (last visited Dec. 
29, 2009). 
57
 New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP, ch. III 
(Viet.). 
58
  New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP, ch. 
III, sec. 2  (Viet.). 
59
  Do Commercial Banks Really Need Temporary Regulation?, VILAF HONG DUC LAW FIRM, Jan. 
31, 2008, http://vilaf.com.vn/index.asp?progid=50005&docID=898D361B-6E68-6152-0D0F-
A31354D75722 (last visited June 12, 2009). 
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A. The New Banking Law Provides the Government with More Control 
Over Management than the Law on Credit Institutions and the 
Enterprise Law 
This section compares the New Banking Law with the Law on Credit 
Institutions and Enterprise Law to examine how the New Banking Law has 
expanded restrictions for managers, while simultaneously heightening 
requirements to serve as a manager. 
1. The New Banking Law is Stricter than the Law on Credit Institutions 
When it Comes to Criminal Investigations, Previous Bankruptcies, 
and Suspensions   
The Law on Credit Institutions was drafted with the intent to create a 
level playing field and prevent preferential treatment.  The New Banking 
Law, on the other hand, vests significantly more control of a company in the 
hands of the state.  While the Law on Credit Institutions prohibits a manager 
under criminal investigation from serving in a bank, the New Banking Law 
expands this requirement to a greater number of positions.60   The New 
Banking Law also prohibits those who have served on boards of bankrupt 
companies and those who have been suspended from previous positions by 
the State Bank, from serving as managers.61  Thus, under the New Banking 
Law, criminal investigations and bankruptcy are all situations that can 
severely affect one’s ability to manage a bank.  These situations, as will be 
demonstrated, are within the power of the state to create, leading to a 
potentially dangerous position for bank managers. 
 
a. According to the New Banking Law, Criminal Investigations, Even 
When Based on Fraudulent Claims, Can Lead to a Manager’s 
Removal  
 
Although both the New Banking Law and the Law on Credit 
Institutions prohibit those under “criminal prosecution” from serving in a 
bank, the New Banking Law extends such a prohibition to more positions.62 
According to Article 40 of the Law on Credit Institutions, the members of 
the managing board, the control board, and executive officers cannot serve if 
                                           
60
  New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP, art 
19, pts. 1, 2 (Viet.). 
61
   New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP, art. 
19(2)(b) (Viet.). 
62
  Id. art. 19, pt. 2. 
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they are under investigation for penal liability. 63   The Law on Credit 
Institutions does not make clear whether those under investigation are 
suspended until exonerated.  This can lead to problems if fraudulent criminal 
claims are lodged against individuals.   
For example, in the Andersen case, Laking endured criminal 
investigations for over four years.64   Laking was released on bail in January 
2005 and was under house arrest until his trial, which as of June 2007, was 
not set.65  During his time in prison and under house arrest, Laking was 
forced to suspend all business activities.66  Lack of evidence, plus the fact 
that a parallel case was dismissed in British courts, should have provided 
evidence that a fraudulent claim was filed.67  Regardless, Vietnamese courts 
still deprived Laking of the ability to serve as a manager, and even the most 
basic rights of leaving his home or seeking employment elsewhere.68 
The New Banking Law extends this problematic aspect of the Law on 
Credit Institutions to apply to more managers.  The New Banking Law 
extends the same requirements to the Chief Accountant, Director of the 
Operation Center, Manager of a Branch, and Director of a subsidiary 
company of the bank. 69   As seen in the Andersen case, “criminal 
prosecution” included years of criminal investigation and probation.  
According to the Vietnamese Penal Code, during a probationary period the 
sentenced persons must not leave their governmentally designated residence 
and are deprived of a number of civic rights. 70  They are banned from 
practicing certain occupations or doing certain jobs.  Probationary periods 
can range from one year to five years from the date an imprisonment penalty 
is completely served. 71   Needless to say, criminal investigations and 
probationary periods can be a severe burden for managers.  Not only can 
they lead to one’s removal from office, as was seen in the Andersen case, if 
questionable charges are brought, one can be kept on probation until a case 
is established.  In Laking’s case, four years after charges were brought, he is 
still on probation waiting for the prosecutors to present their case.   
 
                                           
63
  Law on Credit Institutions, 1997, No. 02/1997/QH10 art. 40, pt. 1 (Viet.) (amended 2004).  
64
  Fair Trials International, supra note 2.  
65
  Id.   
66
 Id.   
67
 Hannan, supra note 6.. 
68
 Vietnam Penal Code, 1999, art. 38 (Viet.), available at http://www.worldlii.org/vn/legis/pc66/.    
69
 New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP, art 
19, pt. 1 (Viet.). 
70
 Vietnam Penal Code, 1999, art. 38 (Viet.). 
71
 Id. 
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b. The New Banking Law Expands Restrictive Prohibitions on Those 
Who Have Served in Bankrupt Companies to Even More Positions 
than the Law on Credit Institutions  
 
The New Banking Law expands similar restrictive provisions found in 
the Law on Credit Institutions regarding those who served in bankrupt 
companies.  The Law on Credit Institutions prohibits former members of the 
managing board and former general directors of bankrupt companies to 
serve as members of the managing board, the control board, and as executive 
officers in the future.72  The New Banking Law expands this restriction to 
partners in the company, council members, control commissioners, and 
members of the management of cooperatives and their chair.73  The New 
Banking Law also specifically mentions head and members of the managing 
board, while the Law on Credit Institutions does not.74   
The New Banking Law makes no distinction between those who are 
to blame for the bankruptcy and those who merely served on a board for a 
company that went bankrupt.  Furthermore, in business, bankruptcies are 
inevitable and are sometimes used in desperate situations as a deliberate 
strategy to reorganize. 75   The New Banking Law therefore prohibits 
managers who were unfortunate to serve on a board for a business that either 
went bankrupt, regardless of the manager’s own culpability, or went 
bankrupt as a result from an established business plan meant to reorganize 
the organization. 
 
c. Under the New Banking Law, the Government Has Far More Control 
Over the Suspension and Subsequent Removal of Managers from 
Office than the Law on Credit Institutions 
 
The New Banking Law creates new restrictive provisions that are not 
found in the Law on Credit Institutions.  The New Banking Law prohibits 
those who have been temporarily suspended from their positions by the State 
Bank from serving as chairman of the board of directors, members of the 
board of directors, chief of the control committee, members of the control 
                                           
72
  Law on Credit Institutions, 1997, No. 02/1997/QH10 (Viet.) (amended 2004).  
73
  New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP, art. 
19(2)(b) (Viet.). 
74
 Id. 
75
  Wilburn N. Moulton et al., Bankruptcy as a Deliberate Strategy: Considerations and Deliberate 
Evidence, 14 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 125, 125-26 (1993). 
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committee, or the general manager.76  Temporary suspension is guided by 
Article 25 of the New Banking Law, which grants expansive control to the 
state regarding such suspensions.  Article 25 allows the State Bank to 
permanently or temporarily suspend the chairman and members of board of 
directors, chief and members of control, and director general in banks that 
are under “special control” of the government if they violate laws found in 
Article 20 of the New Banking Law.77  “Special control” according to the 
New Banking Law is when a company is in danger of losing its ability to 
maintain solvency and pay its customers, and is therefore, placed under the 
control of the State Bank.78   
Given the fact that creating “special control” over a company is 
completely up to the State Bank, this can lead to problems.  Since “special 
control” is when a company is in any danger of losing its ability to maintain 
solvency and pay off its customers, a company’s financial stability is 
important.  However, assessing a company’s financial stability has been a 
problem, especially when it comes to whether the company is capable of 
paying off its loans from the government.79  According to some reports, the 
State Bank has non-performing loans under control and 4.7% of such loans 
are outstanding.80  However, the true level of non-performing and under-
performing loans in Vietnam's financial system is difficult to gauge due to 
the enduring lack of transparency and poor public disclosure.81  Therefore, 
the State Bank has wide discretion to administer “special control” over some 
businesses, while leaving others alone. 
2. The New Banking Law is Stricter than the Enterprise Law When it 
comes to Criminal Investigations, Bankruptcy, and Required 
Qualifications 
The Enterprise Law was created with the intent to protect businesses 
from government intervention. 82  It does this by removing burdensome 
government regulations that restrict Vietnamese business operations.83  The 
                                           
76
 New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP, art. 
19(2)(d) (Viet.). 
77
  Id. art. 25(1)(2)(3)(4). 
78
  Id. ch. 5. 
79
 Hoang Tien Loi, An Update on Non-Performing Loans Resolution and Banking Reform in Viet 
Nam, in ASIAN INSOLVENCY SYSTEMS: CLOSING THE IMPLEMENTATION GAP 139 (2007). 
80
  Id. 
81
  Karl D John, Vietnam’s Banks: A Wild New World, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Apr. 19, 2006. 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HD19Ae03.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2010). 
82
  See Law on Enterprises, 2005, No. 60/2005/QH11, arts. 1, 5 (Viet.). 
83
  Id. 
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New Banking Law departs from this approach and offers different 
requirements for those who have engaged in criminal activities and for those 
who have served in bankrupt companies. 84   The Enterprise Law also 
provides for less rigid education and experience requirements for those 
serving in banks compared to the New Banking Law.85  The New Banking 
Law therefore reintroduces burdensome government regulations that the 
Enterprise Law attempted to remove. 
 
a. The New Banking Law’s Significantly Stricter Provisions Concerning 
Criminal Investigations Create Confusion as to Which Law Should 
Apply   
 
While the Law on Credit Institutions and the New Banking Law 
prohibit those who are under penal investigation from serving in certain 
managerial positions, the Enterprise Law does not.  Article 13(2)(e) of the 
Enterprise Law only restricts persons who are serving an imprisoned 
punishment or prohibited by the court from managing an enterprise.86  Thus 
the Enterprise Law is less restrictive than both laws when it comes to 
criminal investigations.  Only those who are convicted of a crime and 
physically incarcerated cannot serve.  Furthermore, according to the 
Enterprise Law, theoretically, one may be incarcerated and still manage an 
enterprise if allowed to do so by the court.87  This is less strict than the Law 
on Credit Institutions’ prohibition against those who are under criminal 
investigation and the New Banking Law’s extension of this prohibition to 
more managerial positions.88   
The significantly stricter provisions of the New Banking Law create 
confusion as to which laws should apply.  Borderline institutions that only 
lend or transfer funds may inadvertently be included in the category with 
more restrictive provisions.  Furthermore, those who have operated under 
the more relaxed provisions of the Enterprise Law may be in jeopardy now 
that the stricter provisions of the New Banking Law may apply.  Although 
criminal investigations are serious and should cause suspicion regarding a 
manager’s ability to run a business, when the Criminal Code is ambiguous 
                                           
84
  New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP, art. 
19, pts. 1, 2 (Viet.). 
85
 Law on Enterprises, 2005, No. 60/2005/QH11, art. 110 (Viet.). 
86
 Law on Enterprises, 2005, No. 60/2005/QH11, art. 13(2)(e) (Viet.). 
87
 Id. art. 13(e). 
88
 New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP, art. 
19, pt. 2 (Viet.). 
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and the Vietnamese government, as seen in the Andersen case, can intervene 
in private enterprise, such a strict provision is problematic.  
 
b. The New Banking Law Complicates Matters When it Creates Its Own 
Guidelines on Bankruptcy as Opposed to Relying on the Law on 
Bankruptcy   
 
The Enterprise Law’s restriction on those who have served in 
enterprises that have gone bankrupt from serving in similar positions in 
SOEs is guided by the Law on Bankruptcy, 89  as opposed to the New 
Banking Law which creates such a condition on its own.90  However, while 
the Law on Bankruptcy prohibits individuals who have served in managerial 
positions in bankrupt companies from serving in similar positions in non-
state owned enterprises for a period of one to three years, the New Banking 
Law takes this prohibition further for some positions and neglects it for 
others.  According to the Law on Bankruptcy, this prohibition applies to the 
owners of private enterprises, partnership members, general directors, 
chairmen and members of managing boards, members’ councils, and 
managers and members of the managerial boards of the cooperatives that are 
declared bankrupt.91  The Law on Bankruptcy adds that these individuals 
shall not be allowed to set up enterprises or cooperatives, and must not work 
as managers of enterprises or cooperatives for one to three years from the 
date the enterprises or cooperatives are declared bankrupt.92   
The New Banking Law adopts this provision, but further stipulates 
that if an individual has served in the aforementioned position, then he or 
she may not serve as a chairman of the board of directors, chief of the 
controllers committee, member of the controllers committee, or general 
manager of the bank indefinitely. 93   Branch directors, the director of 
transactions, and the director of the company’s banks are not subject to the 
New Banking Law’s prohibition against those who have served in similar 
positions in bankrupt companies.94  Thus, it is unclear if they are subject to 
                                           
89
 Bankruptcy Law, 2004, No. 21/2004/QH11 (Viet.).  This law prescribes bankruptcy procedures 
for enterprises and cooperatives and serves as legal basis for the restoration or abolition of enterprises that 
suffer chronic losses and insolvency.  The Law took effect on October 15, 2004.  
90
  Law on Enterprises, 2005, No. 60/2005/QH11, art. 13(2)(g) (Viet.). 
91
  Bankruptcy Law, 2004, No. 21/2004/QH11, art. 94(2) (Viet.). 
92
  Id. 
93
  New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP, art. 
19(2)(d) (Viet.). 
94
  Id. art. 19(2)(b). 
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the bankruptcy provision in the New Banking Law or if they are subject to 
the rules found in the Law on Bankruptcy.   
While the Enterprise Law defers to the Law on Bankruptcy, the New 
Banking Law takes some provisions of the Law on Bankruptcy and 
interprets them more strictly for some positions and completely ignores them 
for others.  Therefore, while the Enterprise Law defers to the Law on 
Bankruptcy to create consistency, the New Banking Law complicates 
matters by taking the issue into its own hands.  Reliance on the Law on 
Bankruptcy for some issues and the New Banking Law’s expanded 
provisions for others makes compliance more difficult. 
 
c. Required Qualifications in the New Banking Law Are More Stringent 
than the Enterprise Law and Provide the State with More Opportunity 
to Remove Managers from Office 
 
The New Banking Law introduces new baseline requirements, which 
differ from the Enterprise Law’s simple and uniform requirements.  In the 
Enterprise law, required qualifications for different managerial positions are 
simple and uniform.  The Enterprise Law discusses the qualification 
requirements for different managerial positions according to the type of 
business and position.  For instance, Articles 57(1)(a) and 116 require that a 
director or general director in a limited liability company (LLC) with more 
than one member and in a shareholding company: 1) have the capacity for 
civil acts; 95 2) not be prohibited from managing an enterprise as stipulated in 
the Enterprise Law;96 and 3) own ten percent or more of the charter capital 
or have expertise and experience in relation to business management or 
major business activities of the company. 97   Section two adds that in 
companies where state-owned capital accounts for more than fifty percent of 
the charter capital, related family members cannot serve as directors. 98  
Members of the board of management and board of supervisors share similar 
requirements to those of the director or general director.99   Pursuant to 
Article 110, members of the board of management must abide by standards 
                                           
95
  For a definition of a shareholding company see Law on Enterprises, 2005, No. 60/2005/QH11, ch. 
IV, art. 77(1) (Viet.).  
96
  Id. arts. 57(1)(a), 116. 
97
  Id. art. 57(1)(b).  The article also allows the enterprise to stipulate its own provisions here.  The 
draft also uses the term, “expertise experience.”  The author will interpret this to mean “expertise and 
experience” since in other sections of the document the qualifications are discussed this way.   
98
  Id.  These family members include wives, husbands, fathers, foster fathers, mothers, foster 
mothers, children, adopted children, or siblings. 
99
  Id. art. 110. 
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found in Article 57, except the percentage of the ownership and prohibited 
positions to which a member can be related is different.100  The rest of the 
positions mentioned in the Enterprise Law do not have as structured a set of 
requirements as found for these positions.  The baseline requirements in the 
law allow banks to be more flexible in their requirements, encouraging more 
investment and dynamic forms of enterprises. 
The New Banking Law, on the other hand, has more explicit clauses 
and new requirements.  The New Banking Law, for instance, requires that 
the Governor of the State Bank must approve the election or appointment of 
chairman and members of the board of directors, chief and members of the 
controllers committee, and general manager of the bank (except for the case 
where the appointment is made by the Prime Minister).101  Furthermore, 
banks must submit the names and resumes of appointed deputy general 
managers, chief accountants, directors of operation centers, manager of a 
branch, and director of a subsidiary company to the State Bank.102 
These requirements, although useful in creating a transparent 
management apparatus, subject management appointees to the approval and 
scrutiny by the state.  In addition, whereas the Law on Enterprises mandates 
that managers have expertise and experience, 103  the New Banking Law 
discusses what this means in greater detail, creating arbitrary baselines such 
as having a university degree in economics to be a general director, or 
having no less than three years serving in a managerial position in a bank or 
other company to serve on the board of directors.104  The New Banking Law 
thus exposes managers to greater scrutiny by the state at both the entry level 
and the decision making level.  Although this can lead to higher standards in 
management, it arguably reduces the autonomy of the manager and 
arbitrarily creates obstacles.   
B. Problems with the Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code Make it 
Easy for the Government to Arbitrarily Remove a Manager from 
Office 
Reliance of the New Banking Law, the Enterprise Law, and the Law 
on Credit Institutions on the Vietnamese Penal Code, particularly with 
                                           
100
 Law on Enterprises, 2005, No. 60/2005/QH11, arts. 110, 122, 57(a) (Viet.).  
101
 New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP, art. 
26, pt. 1 (Viet.). 
102
 Id. art. 26, pt. 2.  
103
  See Law on Enterprises, 2005, No. 60/2005/QH11, art. 57 (Viet.).   
104
  New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP, art. 
21(1)(c) (Viet.). 
348 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 19 NO. 2 
 
 
regard to certain provisions such as those regarding “criminal prosecutions,” 
highlights the much broader issue of weak procedural infrastructures.  When 
the New Banking Law relies on the ambiguous and problematic nature of the 
Penal Code, it is argued that managers are further at risk from losing their 
positions because of the potential for frivolous investigations and filing of 
lawsuits.  To establish this argument, this section analyzes problems in the 
Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code and ends with a discussion of 
the Andersen case, which demonstrates how such problems have played out 
in the past.   
1. Ambiguous Clauses in the Penal Code Can Lead to a Manager Being 
Removed from Office Under the New Banking Law 
The expanded significance of criminal investigations and convictions 
in the New Banking Law requires the existence of a clear and effective Penal 
Code.  Article 19 of the New Banking Law mandates that those who are 
under criminal investigation, those who have been convicted for crimes 
against national security or violating private property rights, or those who 
have been convicted of serious crimes cannot serve as a member of the 
board of directors, members of the control commission, the general director, 
or the deputy general of the bank.105  In addition to being broad, the New 
Banking Law poorly defines these potential grounds for removal.  The New 
Banking Law also relies on the criminal system’s ability to investigate 
carefully, since an investigation alone may lead to the loss of one’s position 
in a company.106   
Launching a criminal investigation on the basis of a legal claim in 
Vietnam is easy because the Penal Code is written broadly and ambiguously. 
According to Article 8 of the Penal Code, a crime is an act dangerous to 
society.107  Such acts can be committed intentionally or unintentionally by a 
person having a capacity for penal liability.108  Penal liability can be found 
when an actor infringes upon the independence, sovereignty, unity, and 
territorial integrity of the nation.109   Furthermore, penal liability is also 
present when an actor infringes upon the political regime, the economic 
                                           
105
  New Law on the Organization and Operation of Commercial Banks, 2009, 59/2009/ND-CP, art. 
19(b)-(d) (Viet.). 
106
  Id. 
107
 Vietnam Penal Code, 1999, art. 8(1) (Viet.). 
108
 Id.  Article 12 stipulates that persons 16 or older shall have to bear penal liability for all crimes 
they commit.  Furthermore, Article 13 states that persons who commit acts dangerous to society while 
suffering from mental disease or disease which deprives them of their capacity to be aware of or to control 
their acts, shall not bear penal liability. 
109
 Id.   
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regime, culture, defense, security, social order and safety, or the legitimate 
rights and interests of organizations. 110  Infringing upon the life, health, 
honor, dignity, freedom, property, as well as other legitimate rights and 
interests of citizens may also lead to penal liability.111  Finally, the code adds 
that infringing upon other socialist legislation may also be considered a 
penal violation. 112   These broad crime definitions enable any act to be 
deemed worthy of investigation.  Furthermore, because many of these 
crimes can be committed either intentionally or unintentionally, the subject 
of the investigation may be completely unaware of his or her liability until 
the lawsuit is initiated. 
2. Due Process Violations Allowed by a Weak Criminal Procedure Code 
Can Facilitate the Initiation of a Frivolous Lawsuit   
The Criminal Procedure Code also facilitates the initiation of 
frivolous lawsuits.  According to Article 164, the party initiating the lawsuit 
must provide names and addresses of parties, the litigator, date of filing, 
name of court, and documents and evidence to prove that the lawsuit is well 
grounded, in addition to the signature and fingerprints of the litigator.113  
While stating a claim is facilitated by the ambiguity found in the Penal 
Code, certain loopholes in the Criminal Procedure Code can also lead to the 
filing of a lawsuit despite a weak legal claim.   
Although Article 165 mandates that litigators accompany their lawsuit 
petitions with documents and or evidence to prove their claims are well 
grounded, what is deemed admissible is also problematic.114  Documents 
strictly under the control of the government are sufficient for admission and 
serve as the basis for a legal claim.115  Nicholson argues this is problematic 
because judicial independence in Vietnam is severely limited and courts are 
intrinsically connected to the Communist Party.116  Therefore, it is easy for 
the government to file claims against a manager to have her removed from 
her position based on evidence within the exclusive domain of the state.   
                                           
110
 Id. 
111
 Id. 
112
 Vietnam Penal Code, 1999, art. 8(1) (Viet.).    
113
 Id. art. 64(2)(a)-(k). 
114
 Id. art. 165. 
115
 Vietnam Penal Code, 1999, art. 64(2)(a)-(k) (Viet.). 
116
 Penelope Nicholson, The Vietnamese Judiciary: Politics of Appointment and Promotion. 14 PAC. 
RIM. L. & POL’Y 1, 15 (2005).  
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3. Government Control Over Management Through Faulty Criminal 
Procedure and Penal Codes Can Be Seen in the Andersen Case   
The case of Andersen, as mentioned in the introduction, demonstrates 
how Vietnam’s poorly drafted criminal procedure laws can lead to one’s 
removal from a management position.  In this case, ambiguity within the 
Criminal Procedure and Penal Codes created significant problems with due 
process, making it very difficult for the foreign manager to assert a defense 
and very easy for the state to remove him from his managerial position in a 
multinational corporation.  Although not based on the New Banking Law, 
this case demonstrates how existing laws in the Law on Credit Institutions 
and Enterprise Law have led to frivolous lawsuits and managers being 
removed from office.  More cases such as Andersen’s will probably follow, 
given the New Banking Law’s expanded reliance on the Penal and Criminal 
Procedure Codes. 
Andersen’s case demonstrates how easy it is for the state or a 
disgruntled investor to file a lawsuit despite a lack of evidence.  To date, it is 
questionable whether or not the two Irishmen lodged a valid complaint 
against Laking and McCormack.117  Although British courts had dropped the 
case for lack of evidence, Vietnamese courts continued to investigate for 
months, leading to an eventual incarceration of Andersen, Hong, Laking, and 
McCormack.118  As of June 2007, Laking, one of the founding members and 
principal defendants, is still awaiting trial while prosecutors continue to 
search for evidence to support their charges. 119   On the other hand, 
Andersen’s case was not expedited until the Danish Foreign Minister raised 
the issue of Andersen’s dire jail conditions and delayed trial date during an 
October 2004 meeting with the Vietnamese Foreign Minister.120  Meanwhile, 
in the United Kingdom on November 5, 2008, the two Irishmen finally 
settled long-running property disputes, which include the assets for which 
Laking, McCormack, Andersen, and Hong were incarcerated.121  Thus, while 
British courts dismiss cases for lack of evidence and British newspapers 
acknowledge the suspicious actions of wealthy businessmen taking on their 
                                           
117
 Fair Trials International, supra note 2.  
118
 Id. 
119
 Id. 
120
 Leif Carlsen, A Danish Nightmare in Vietnam, SCANDASIA.COM, Feb. 16, 2005, 
http://www.scandasia.com/viewNews.php?news_id=1372&coun_code=vn (last visited Jan. 4, 2009). 
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 Mary Carolan, Long-running Dispute Over Property Company Settled, THE IRISH TIMES, Nov. 5, 
2008, available at LEXIS, Irish Times File. 
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competitors in court,122 Vietnamese courts continue to investigate and detain 
defendants.123 
This case also demonstrates how difficult it is for parties to assert a 
defense.  While incarcerated, when Andersen was able to receive visitors, 
the visitors were only allowed twenty minutes and were forced to speak in 
English in order for the guards to understand the content of their 
communication.124  The case was not to be discussed and everything said 
was translated into Vietnamese while heavily armed policemen watched the 
visits intently. 125   After sixteen months of waiting, Andersen had the 
opportunity to plead his case in front of a judge and in the presence of his 
lawyers, the Danish ambassador, and members of the Danish press. 126  
During trial however, Andersen’s interpreters spoke broken and incompetent 
English, prompting protests from both the Danish ambassador and his 
British colleague.127  As for Laking, he did not have any access to a lawyer 
for a period of four months.128  He was not allowed to communicate with his 
lawyer in private, nor was his right for privileged correspondence with his 
lawyer upheld, while claimants were allowed to intimidate him on four 
occasions during his imprisonment.129  During trial, the interpreters were 
supplied by the legal representatives of the claimants and were deeply 
biased.130  
IV. PROBLEMS IN THE NEW BANKING LAW CAN BE RESOLVED BY RELYING 
ON CERTAIN EXISTING LAWS WHILE UPGRADING OTHERS  
This section argues that despite its problems, the New Banking Law is 
a step in the right direction.  Although evidence has shown that the 
government is willing to intervene in management, all is not lost.  Problems 
found in the banking law can be resolved by focusing on existing laws such 
as the Enterprise Law and the Bankruptcy Law.  Furthermore, by critically 
reviewing loopholes in the Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes, 
management rights, and civil rights in general, can improve.  
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A. The New Banking Law Should Rely on Updated Laws Such as the Law 
on Enterprises 
To remedy problems with the new banking law, the Vietnamese 
government can rely on the management requirements in the Law on 
Enterprises.  Managers under this law are only required to act in the best 
interest of the company, 131  providing much leeway for managers to 
experiment and expand their businesses.  They are also not bogged down by 
the formal requirements of the New Banking Law that require a baseline of 
education in order to serve as a manager.132   
Results of the broad management requirements under the Enterprise 
Law are astonishing.  Under the Enterprise Law, private enterprise in 
Vietnam has flourished.  The law was enacted in 1999, and from 2000 to 
2005, more than 180,000 enterprises were established, and dozens of 
existing enterprises expanded their activities.133  These enterprises created 
one million new jobs each year and dramatically diversified the nation’s 
industrial and agricultural capacity, boosted exports, and enhanced products 
offered by the services industry.134  
B. The New Banking Law Should Rely on the Bankruptcy Law as 
Opposed to Creating its Own Provisions on Bankruptcy 
While the Enterprise Law and the Law on Credit Institutions both 
defer to the Law on Bankruptcy to create consistency,135 the New Banking 
Law on the other hand complicates matters by creating its own provisions on 
the issue.136  The New Banking Law takes some provisions of the Law on 
Bankruptcy and interprets them more strictly for some positions and 
completely ignores them for others.137  Although the Bankruptcy Law has 
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 Law on Enterprises, 2005, No. 60/2005/QH11, art. 42 (Viet.). 
132
 This is especially problematic when Vietnam currently experiences low tertiary enrollment rates. 
See UNESCO INSTITUTE FOR STATISTICS, UIS STATISTICS IN BRIEF: VIETNAM (2007), 
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136
 See supra Section II(B)(ii). 
137
 Id. 
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many problems of its own, more consistency results when all three laws rely 
on its provisions.  One commentator found inconsistency in a similar 
situation for instance when the Bankruptcy Law did not apply to small-scale 
enterprises.138  Because small-scale enterprises relied on the Civil Code, 
which until recently had not been amended to refer to the Bankruptcy Law, 
small-scale enterprises were able to escape bankruptcy, while larger 
enterprises registered under the Law on Enterprises went bankrupt. 139  
Second, the Bankruptcy Law provides a clear definition of bankruptcy, the 
categories of persons having the right to file bankruptcy petitions, and 
sanctions and additional restrictions for directors, board members, owners of 
bankrupt businesses, etc.140  Many of these provisions may either be missing 
or conflicted out if drawn up independently in the New Banking Law.  Thus, 
in addition to relying on management principles of the Enterprise Law, the 
New Banking Law should refer to the Bankruptcy Law, as opposed to 
attempting to create its own provisions on the topic. 
C. By Strengthening the Rights of the Accused, Civil Rights and the 
Rights of Managers Will Improve 
Lastly, by strengthening the rights of the accused, management rights 
and civil rights will improve.  In order to do this, the Vietnamese 
government should revise the Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes.  
Although Vietnam has been a party to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights since 1982, peaceful government critics have been 
charged with “abusing democratic freedoms to infringe upon the interests of 
the State.”141  Despite implementing wide-reaching economic reforms such 
as the new banking law, Vietnam is still a monolithic one-party state and its 
citizens are often denied basic civil liberties.142  Cases such as Andersen may 
become more prolific if Vietnam continues to rely on its ambiguous and 
faulty Penal and Criminal Procedure Code provisions.  Amnesty 
International has urged the Vietnamese government to repeal or amend 
provisions in the 1999 Penal Code to ensure that ambiguous provisions 
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relating to national security are clearly defined or removed, so they cannot 
be applied in an arbitrary manner.143  Such amendments can not only affect 
an individual’s civil and political rights, but economic rights as well, since 
the same provisions used to crack down on dissidents can be used by the 
government to crack down on unruly managers, as seen in the new banking 
law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Vietnam is currently privatizing its state-owned banks to meet the 
growing internal demand for efficient financial and credit services and to 
fulfill its international obligations.  The New Banking Law represents a big 
step forward in Vietnam’s equitization campaigns.  The New Banking Law 
provides guidance on how equitized banks shall be managed.  It is also far 
more sophisticated, as it expands aspects of the previous law that were 
previously vague.   
In its expansion however, the New Banking Law has introduced a 
whole new set of problems.  First, the law conflicts with the existing legal 
infrastructure regarding banks.  In its attempts to bring banking management 
requirements in line with existing laws, it has gone so far as to expand and 
increase the requirements, which unnecessarily puts management at risk of 
losing their positions.  Second, although the New Banking Law arguably 
addresses weaknesses in the previous law, loopholes in the legal 
infrastructure make it so that the government can intervene and strip an 
individual of rights normally afforded elsewhere—a troubling sign when 
management requirements and restrictions are increased.  Last, increasing 
requirements, and evidence of a swift and unforgiving government, are not 
conducive to inspiring investor confidence, or recruiting international talent 
to help modernize or professionalize state-owned banks.  These facts reveal 
a government that goes to extreme lengths to protect its interests, not one 
interested in standing behind the decisions of its banks and their managers.   
Vietnam has proven to be aggressive and driven when it comes to 
economic growth.  Equitizing its state-owned bank is a huge step in 
modernizing its economy.  However, the New Banking Law serves as an 
example of the nation’s attempt to release control over its state-owned banks 
while preserving avenues for intervention when necessary.  Such attempts to 
maintain control can be self-destructive when the heavy hand of government 
strangles the already limited channels for private investment and 
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development.  However, existing legislation such as the Enterprise Law 
proves that Vietnam is capable of releasing control and allowing more 
freedom and autonomy to managers.  Changes to banking laws make no 
difference, however, if problematic provisions in the Penal and Criminal 
Procedure Codes continue to provide the government with expansive 
authority to intervene in private enterprise.  Relaxing management 
regulations while shoring up civil liberties will greatly enhance government 
attempts to modernize the country’s banking industry. 
